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Taboo or pragmatism?  
Lopez Obrador’s dilemma 
over drug trafficking*
Esteban Arratia Sandovala ■ Aldo Garrido Quirozb
“You can’t fight evil with evil.”
Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
Abstract: During his election campaign, the new president of Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, 
proposed to grant an amnesty to those involved in drug production and trafficking in order to end 
the war on drugs, thus moving between taboo and pragmatism. Undoubtedly, this initiative is a 
radical change in the state approach to this conflict, as it involves typical tools of a peace process, 
such as demobilization, reintegration and transitional justice. But what are the main risks of this 
offer? This reflection paper aims to answer this question, analyzing, from a qualitative approach, the 
main constraints of this proposal. The main conclusion is that an amnesty is only a damage limitation 
strategy since it does not seek to de-escalate the illicit market, but to model its behavior—low profile, 
with no open confrontation position, and moderate mortality rates. 
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¿Tabú o pragmatismo? El dilema de López Obrador  
sobre el tráfico de drogas
“No se puede enfrentar el mal con el mal”.
Andrés Manuel López Obrador. 
Resumen: Durante su campaña electoral, el nuevo presidente de México, Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador, propuso conceder una amnistía a los involucrados en la producción y tráfico de drogas para 
poner fin a la guerra contra las drogas, moviéndose así entre el tabú y el pragmatismo. Sin duda, esta 
iniciativa es un cambio radical en el enfoque del Estado con respecto a este conflicto, ya que involu-
cra las herramientas tradicionales de un proceso de paz, por ejemplo, la desmovilización, la reinte-
gración y la justicia transicional. Sin embargo, ¿cuáles son los principales riesgos de esta propuesta? 
Este documento de reflexión pretende responder a este interrogante, mediante un análisis, desde 
un enfoque cualitativo, de las principales limitaciones de esta propuesta. La principal conclusión es 
que la amnistía es sólo una estrategia de limitación de daños, ya que no busca desescalar el mercado 
ilícito, sino modelar su comportamiento (bajo perfil), sin una posición de enfrentamiento abierto y 
con tasas de mortalidad moderadas. 
Palabras clave: Conflicto armado; agendas criminales; México; procesos de paz; guerra contra las 
drogas.
Tabu ou Pragmatismo? O Dilema de López 
Obrador sobre o Tráfico de Drogas
“Não se pode enfrentar o mal com o mal.”
Andrés Manuel López Obrador.
Resumo: Durante sua campanha eleitoral, o novo presidente do México, Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador, propôs conceder uma anistia aos envolvidos na produção e tráfico de drogas para acabar 
com a guerra contra as drogas, movendo-se, assim, entre o tabu e o pragmatismo. Sem dúvidas, 
essa iniciativa é uma mudança radical no enfoque do Estado a respeito desse conflito, já que envolve 
as ferramentas tradicionais de um processo de paz, por exemplo, a desmobilização, a reintegração 
e a justiça de transição. Contudo, quais são os principais riscos dessa proposta? Este artigo de re-
flexão pretende responder a essa questão por meio de uma análise, de abordagem qualitativa, das 
primordiais limitações da proposta. Conclui-se que a anistia é somente uma estratégia de limitação 
de danos, já que não busca desescalar o mercado ilícito, mas sim moldar seu comportamento (baixo 
perfil), sem uma posição de enfrentamento aberto e com taxas de mortalidade moderadas.
Palavras-chave: conflito armado; agendas criminais; México; processos de paz; guerra contra as 
drogas.
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Radical change? From the war 
on drugs to pacification 
During his election campaign, the new presi-
dent of Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador 
(amlo), proposed to grant an amnesty to those 
involved in drug production and trafficking 
in order to end the War on drugs initiated by 
former president, Felipe Calderon (2006-12). 
Undoubtedly, this initiative is a radical change 
to the state approach to this armed conflict1, as it 
involves peace process mechanisms2, such as de-
mobilization, reintegration and transitional jus-
tice. The underlying assumption for this measure 
is that the current strategy to combat drug traf-
ficking, based on coercive measures, seems not to 
have reduced the high homicide rates associated 
with this illicit economy reported during the last 
decade (Figure 1). 
1 Several indicators have been used as evidence to argue that 
the war on drugs could qualify as an armed conflict; for example, 
Conflict Barometer 2017, produced by the Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research, assessed its intensity at grade 5: 
limited war. Depending on the scale measuring this index, this 
category corresponds to a violent conflict in which violent force 
is used with a certain continuity in an organized and systematic 
manner. Conflict parties take extensive measures, depending on 
the situation. The level of destruction is massive and long lasting. 
See hiik, 2018. 
2 A peace process is defined as an effort to end a conflict among 
different actors by dialogue and non-violent means. Its objectives 
and forms can range from negotiating a bilateral ceasefire, inter-
rupting homicidal violence and, in some cases, signing a peace 
agreement. It is part of a political agreement that represents the 
negotiation on access to state resources and political, social, eco-
nomic and judicial concessions in exchange for ending violence 
and hostilities. See Boer & Bosetti, 2017, p. 9. 
In 2006, Felipe Calderón put the Mexican 
armed forces and militarized federal police in 
charge of eradicating organized crime. He prom-
ised to quickly restore the state’s formal control 
across the country, deploying many troops to 
break cartels’ territorial dominion of and targeting 
their bosses with kill-or-capture operations (Crisis 
Group, 2018). 
Since then, organized crime in Mexico has 
transformed. At the end of 2006, at the start of the 
militarized campaign, six large drug trafficking 
organizations competed for a handful of coveted 
drug production and transit territories and were 
responsible for much of the lethal violence. As 
the government had murdered or captured many 
criminal leaders, these six cartels fragmented into 
dozens of smaller criminal groups (Crisis Group, 
2018) and also a varied increase in troops deployed 
to face cartel factions as can be seen in Figure 2.
Felipe Calderon´s presidency
(Began in December 2006)
Enrique Peña Nieto´s presidency
















Figure 2. Number of Mexican Troops (Soldiers and Mari-
nes) Deployed in the War on Drugs (2009-12)
Source: Prepared by the authors from Crisis Group, 2018.
Figure 1. Estimated Organized Crime-Related Violence in Mexico (2007-17)
Source: Prepared by the authors from Roel, 2018.
Public security in Mexico has become largely 
dependent on the army and the navy. Lacking 
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financing, personnel and armament, municipal 
police forces have shown that they cannot, and 
sometimes do not want to, face the advance of 
organized crime. Meanwhile, crime and conflict 
have deep roots within the state. Corruption, in-
cluding internal corruption of the armed forces 
and federal police, supports the collusion of the 
state with criminals (Crisis Group, 2018).
In this regard, Lessing (2018) promotes the de-
bate about whether it is appropriate to understand 
violence associated with the war on drugs as an 
armed conflict. From his point of view, although 
Mexican cartels do not primarily have political 
objectives —other than maintaining corrupt au-
thorities on their side—, there are several private 
armies operating in the national territory to be de-
mobilized, on which the drug market is based and 
which exercise violence to the extent that state ac-
tion is repressive. Thus, criminal organizations, in 
order to protect themselves from the state, coun-
terattack with similar military resources to those 
used by the government, what the author calls 
cartel-state war. 
Under this scheme, the main reason for the 
emergence and development of such conflicts is 
that the state response has had a negative impact 
on the dynamics of criminal violence. The state’s 
involvement in illicit markets and pursuit of 
armed factions has been identified as a disturbing 
factor, creating favorable conditions for increased 
violence (Cruz, 2016). It is argued that there is a 
correlation between arrests and dejection of king-
pins and an increase in violence (Guerrero, 2018), 
between military intervention and increased 
violence (Espinosa & Rubin, 2015), and between 
the arrest of ringleaders and rising crime rates 
(Felbab-Brown & Calderón, 2012). 
This vicious circle intertwines with three fac-
tors: lack of state capability because institutions 
are repression-oriented; corrupt officials who 
frustrate government efforts; and a shortsighted 
vision that affects decision-making; for example, 
repeated outbreaks of violence that incentivize the 
use of repressive policies. On the latter, the World 
Bank (2018) says institutional weakness is a com-
mon factor that explains the cycles of violence. 
So, without deterrence, there is little chance that 
drug-related killings stop (Boer & Bosetti, 2015). 
It should not be forgotten that all countries have 
manifestations of organized crime; the degree of 
infiltration of state institutions obviously varies, 
but the difference is in how authorities respond to 
it (Eisner, 2015).
Furthermore, it is worth remembering that 
Mexico has witnessed fragmentation patterns, 
diversification and criminal migration combined 
to (re)produce extreme violence. Criminal orga-
nizations are not only involved in wars against 
competitors and officials, but also in internal con-
flicts while rival factions try to gain control over 
illicit markets (Garzon, 2016); i.e., the character-
istics and dynamics of violence are also strongly 
associated with the existence of multiple criminal 
economies. In fact, the size of an illicit economy 
may directly affect the level of confrontations and 
disputes among competitors.
No easy way out: The risks of 
granting an amnesty to drug 
cartels
Closely related to the previous section, it should 
be noted that the widespread impact of drug-re-
lated violence in Mexico, coupled with the inef-
fective policies implemented so far to mitigate it, 
has caused intense debate in media and academia 
about how useful some classic tools of peace pro-
cesses, such as the amnesty proposed by amlo, 
might be to contain it. Such a scenario poses a rel-
evant question: What are their main risks?
amlo’s approach reflects a pragmatic view 
of the problem; it would necessarily involve an 
agreement between cartels, on the one hand, and 
the state’s authority, on the other, analogous to 
supporting transitional justice in post-conflict 
contexts. Offering drug traffickers some kind of ju-
dicial benefit such as an amnesty (an agreement on 
reduced prison terms, or changing the legal frame-
work so as to rule out extradition) presupposes and 
implies thorough knowledge of their levels of or-
ganizational cohesion and legitimacy (Muggah, 
Carpenter, & McDougal, 2013). 
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Indeed, this political option represents an op-
portunity to promote a certain level of commit-
ment from those involved, even though it may 
not necessarily mean a cease of violence associ-
ated with drug trafficking. Following this line of 
thought, it is worth pointing out that, instead of 
openly attacking or blocking negotiated pacifica-
tion processes which is the frame of the amnesty 
offered by amlo, drug cartels act as spoilers3 tend-
ing to subvert and embed their criminal agendas 
in the agreements reached4 (Cockayne, Boer, & 
Bosetti, 2017).
Nevertheless, such measures demonstrate the 
weakness of the state because they focus on the 
problem from the logic of drug trafficking organi-
zations, rather than reviewing and strengthening 
institutional capabilities to fight organized crime. 
As Villalobos (2012) affirms, proposals that op-
pose confronting organized crime try to find ways 
to appease criminals, rather than to strengthen 
the state to control them. The former seems more 
comfortable than the latter, since it depends on 
criminals, while the other needs a high share of 
political will. In this regard, amlo’s offer is part of 
the tendency to use law enforcement strategically, 
in order to tolerate or simply manage drug-related 
violence, instead of suppressing it. This shows that 
he is not interested in monopolizing the use of vio-
lence according to Weber’s theory5. 
A report prepared by the OAS (2015) argue that 
an amnesty is accepted and encouraged in con-
ventional conflicts, but often finds limits against 
3 The concept of spoiler was originally introduced by Stephen 
Stedman to describe actors who use violence to oppose, under-
mine, or manipulate peace processes. See Stedman, 1997, p. 8. 
4 Criminal agendas refer to a program or plan of an under-
lying criminal nature conducted by actors competing for gov-
ernment and public management of state resources. They can 
be adopted by a wide range of actors, such as criminal groups, 
insurgents, companies, public officials and political leaders. In-
deed, individuals and groups can take on both strategies and 
roles (political and criminal) depending on the context. Lack of 
knowledge of criminal agendas poses challenges in terms of the 
legitimacy of a peace process or its eventual breakup. See Boer 
& Bosetti, 2017, p. 9. 
5 One of the most accepted assumptions in the study of gover-
nance from Weber’s theory is that states will try to always hold a 
monopoly on violence within its territory. See Naim, 2014, p. 115. 
the criminal violence that prevails in Mexico, a 
scenario known as other situations of violence 
under International Humanitarian Law. This is 
because criminals and insurgents have agendas 
and motivations of a different nature. Insurgents 
as non-state armed actors6 are, in principle, offi-
cial spokespeople susceptible to be amnestied, a 
treatment resulting inapplicable to organizations 
involved in criminal activities (Plant & Dudouet, 
2015). 
We should not lose sight of the fact that crimi-
nal groups are motivated primarily by profit, while 
rebels usually have a political-ideological objec-
tive, such as accessing state power or changing the 
established order. Given this distinction, it is dif-
ficult to accept that criminal groups seek political 
power, except to corrupt it, buy it off, and success-
fully conduct business (Benitez-Manaut, 2011).
Such an approach is related to the pattern ob-
served by Huntington (1972) 40 years ago: “The 
criminalization of political violence is more preva-
lent than the politicization of criminal violence” 
(p. 13). Following this logic, Phillips (2015) states 
that there are two particularly relevant kinds of 
incentives: material incentives and intentional 
incentives. The material ones are basically finan-
cial or other tangible benefits, on which organized 
crime depends to develop its illicit economies. 
Intentional incentives are intangible rewards that 
derive from the sense of satisfaction in having con-
tributed to a good cause or attempting to achieve 
the greater good, as is the case of rebels (Table 1).
Likewise, this aspect represents a challenge to 
conventional tools used in conflict management 
called path dependency as identified by Whitfield 
(2013), in which political actors may be partners 
for peace-building, while criminal actors are a 
target for the police. Thus, curbing criminal vio-
lence becomes more complex than addressing 
6 Podder defines this category as groups: a) willing and able 
to use violence to achieve their goals; b) not integrated into for-
malized state institutions; c) in possession of certain degrees of 
autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resourc-
es and infrastructure (although they can be supported by a state 
actor, official or other players who obtain personal benefits from 
this support); and d) whose organization or structure exists for a 
certain period. See Podder, 2012, p. 6.
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political violence by the nature of the commit-
ment. Generally, granting an amnesty to political 
actors is linked to a Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration (ddr)7 process; however, when 
it comes to expectations, criminal groups are gen-
erally more limited to the reasons described fur-
ther on.
Sustaining logic
Granting an amnesty to criminal groups requires 
an understanding of two complementary aspects. 
First, we need to understand the criminal economy 
that sustains them, the reasons for participation 
and challenges in the integration of these actors in 
the formal economy. This is even more important 
considering the current trends of criminal violence 
in Mexico: a rapid transformation and change of 
leadership, in combination with the resistance of 
the criminal economy (Gonzalez Bustelo, 2016). 
So, it is possible to say that judicial benefits turn 
out to be inapplicable to criminal organizations as 
it threatens their fundamental financial interests 
and would be like a potential plea to their right to 
bankruptcy. Given that they have no political-ide-
ological motivations, there is no way to dissuade 
them to disarm through a political agreement and, 
therefore, to operate within the economic logic. 
In other words, when it comes to illegal political 
7  Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (ddr) 
mainly aims to develop conditions necessary to ensure a success-
ful social, political and economic reintegration of former combat-
ants into civil life through a wide range of training, job creation, 
housing, psychological assistance and re-socialization programs. 
Thus, the ddr process seeks to move towards lasting and stable 
peace, providing these individuals with alternative livelihoods 
so they can become active participants during post-conflict. See 
Moore & Ehrhart, 2012, p. 55. 
groups, the assumption that amnesty granting 
guarantees may achieve disarmament is reason-
ably certain, but not when it comes to criminal 
groups, whose ultimate goal is to profit, as in the 
case of drug trafficking (Zepeda, 2018).
Following this logic, it should be mentioned 
that specialized literature often tends to ignore 
the moral implications of violence. Social sciences, 
such as criminology, economics or political sci-
ence, emphasize the rational nature of violence 
and its instrumental value or utility, attributing it 
certain ends and means. For differentiation pur-
poses, Schedler (2014) proposes four fundamental 
dimensions of violence morphology: final recipi-
ent, degree of organization, motivations and power 
relations (Table 2). So, when it comes to insurgen-
cy, no reference is made to the exercise of a kind 
of accidental, random, disorganized violence, but 
a violence that pursues a specific objective of a po-
litical nature (Guindo, 2013). Rebels use violence 
for five reasons: desertion, intimidation, provok-
ing a government response, spoiling negotiations, 
and as publicity for their cause (Phillips, 2015). 
Instead, this kind of violence is inconsistent 
with the objectives pursued by illegal groups such 
as cartels as this is a tool in itself. It is worth not-
ing that drug trafficking violence causes a high 
degree of violence for a quite simple reason: it is 
unlawful. There are no regulating mechanisms to 
these actions, causing those involved to resort to 
even further violence. Illegality, combined with 
weak institutions that poorly fulfill the function 
of suppressing this business, leads these groups 
to settle their disputes violently. In sum, crimi-
nal groups, without legal recourse, use violence to 
enforce agreements, but its excessive use is often 
costly and may result in death or imprisonment of 
those responsible. Therefore, their goal is different, 
as they seek to protect or expand illegal activities 
territorially.
Further challenges
Absence of a political-ideological agenda in crimi-
nal organizations represents a different chal-
lenge—no obvious possibility of a peace process 
with an aim to stop violence in exchange for the 
opportunity of attaining goals by peaceful and 
Table 1. Incentives/Insurgency Market vs. Transnatio-
nal Organized Crime







Market Ideas/Public Opinion Illicit Economies
Source: Prepared by the authors from Phillips, 2015.
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democratic means (Plant & Dudouet, 2015). This 
is an insurmountable problem in contexts where 
rent-seeking is the force that drives the actions of 
non-state armed actors, such as cartels. The pos-
sibility of renouncing the use of its main tool to 
establish dominion, resolve disputes and man-
age their illegal activities is extremely low (Kemp, 
Shaw, & Boutellis, 2013). While there are lucrative 
illegal markets, the use of violence is necessary.
In other words, what motivates drug dealers to 
engage in this activity, using violence as a mecha-
nism, is its high profit margin. And that incentive 
will not disappear with an amnesty, at least for 
most of those involved in this activity (Chabat, 
2018). The possibility that leaders and members 
of drug cartels be willing to give up their primary 
means to manage their plazas8 does not attract 
much support in Mexico. The prevailing (founded) 
opinion is that human dignity is the very last of 
their priorities;  therefore, an amnesty would not 
solve the problem of violence because, even if the 
amnestied ceased their criminal activities, the eco-
nomic incentive would continue, and new crimi-
nals would take up their role and place.
8  The term plaza has been used to describe the territories where 
they traffic drugs along the border of the United States with Mexi-
co. Most of the major cartels operated in a specific place, usually 
focusing on one of the two twin border cities. Controlling a plaza 
entails an important flow of associated revenue. See unodc, 2012, 
p. 19.
There may be no real perspective on the ef-
fectiveness of an amnesty either without the will-
ingness to transform the calculated rationale of 
cartels. Van Den Eertwegh (2016) considers that 
the latter is particularly critical because there is a 
risk of a zero-sum game; i.e., criminal actors will 
find it virtually impossible to abandon their il-
licit economies overnight and the government will 
have to tolerate crimes during an adjustment phase 
and assimilate a difficult period for the popula-
tion. This involves promoting and sustaining the 
economic transformation necessary to address 
criminal agendas without losing social support 
for a peace process; therefore, setting a strategy for 
criminals’ economic needs, able to limit their in-
volvement in illicit markets, requires negotiating 
a broader set of standards for social legitimacy, le-
gality of certain activities, and use of violence.
Moreover, their sources of legitimacy and the 
relationships they have with communities often 
range between conformity and resistance, between 
cooptation and coercion9. Illicit economies are 
9 Wolff uses three justifications that supposedly explain the re-
lationship of criminal groups with their host community. First, 
people have “preferences for social order and material welfare in-
stead of disorder and misery. Such communities seek some form 
of authority to provide these benefits when it lacks them. Second, 
criminal actors try to establish political and social control over the 
territory in the absence of an effective authority that can reduce 
costs of competition on the illicit market. Finally, this relationship 
is built from the logic of territorial control; criminal groups are 
going to invest in cultivating the relationship with their host com-
Table 2. Fundamental Dimensions of Violence Morphology
Dimension Conceptualization
Final Recipient
(state agents or citizens)








When violent acts seem to be motivated by general concerns such as public policies, state institutions 
or structure of the political community, it is political violence. When it seems to be motivated by 




Individuals may appeal to violence against adversaries weaker than them, operating as a tool of 
domination. When social groups appeal to violence against other groups of similar level, it operates as 
an instrument of competition. When less important actors exert violence against members of higher 
hierarchical level, it is rebellion.
Source: Prepared by the authors from Schedler, 2014.
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not only related to organized crime, but to liveli-
hoods of large segments of the population who 
lack alternatives (Muggah & O’Donnell, 2015); i.e., 
peace processes, of which the granting of an am-
nesty is part, have to pay attention to the political 
economy of violence. Thus, granting an amnesty 
in situations other than armed conflicts is risky 
when there is a hybrid political order, in which 
non-state armed actors, such as cartels, may also 
perform some public functions at the local level 
(Santamaría, 2017). 
Accordingly, Fiorentini and Peltzman (1977) 
establish that when a criminal organization has 
gained a monopoly on coercion in its area, it may 
perform activities for the state, such as tax collec-
tion or the provision of public goods and services; 
i.e., criminal groups progressively acquire legiti-
macy as parallel authorities in areas where they 
operate, supplanting the state in the monopoly on 
violence . 
From this perspective, it should be reminded 
that a state develops its claim to the monopoly on 
the legitimate use of violence, i.e., with the ability 
to exercise authority within its borders to protect 
its inhabitants. Thus, an element of the social con-
tract that anchors its legitimacy is to prevent the 
use of coercion by others in their territory. If a state 
is weak or lacks the capacity to exercise control 
over an area or geographic location, it will prob-
ably be considered illegitimate by citizens, and 
various non-state actors can fill that power vacu-
um. As a result, state institutions end up sharing 
control with these informal institutions (Shaw & 
Kemp, 2012). The strategic role of criminal actors 
affects the state’s fundamental purpose and has 
political implications, as they act as competitive 
state-makers undermining its functionality and 
legitimacy. So, the greater order and security pro-
vided to communities, the greater the possibility of 
becoming proto-states de facto with a high degree 
of political capital10, thus reducing their ability to 
act (Felbab-Brown, 2013a). 
munities in order to reduce the cost of control, since only using 
coercion may increase it exorbitantly. See Wolff, 2015.
10 According to Felbab-Brown, political capital is perceived 
legitimacy (public confidence that the actions of criminals are 
Leverage
Actors who do not have any political ideology or 
noble cause from a social point of view will always 
perceive this judicial or legal benefit as a chance 
to obtain preferential treatment and perpetuate 
confrontation. Indeed, the Mexican government 
will have to solve difficult issues in the applica-
tion of prison sentences inferior than those es-
tablished for crimes committed by approving 
changes in the legal framework, such as the an-
nulment of extraditions (Bosetti, Cockayne, & 
Boer, 2016). From this perspective, Hope (2012) 
asserts that granting an amnesty to cartels, as 
opposed to insurgent forces such as the current-
ly demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (farc), is morally and politically com-
plex since it involves giving in to a fundamental 
principle:  law is non-negotiable. This violates 
the ethics of conviction in the Weber’s sense.
This dilemma is illustrated by the controversial 
truce between La Mara Salvatrucha (ms13) and 
Barrio 18 in El Salvador during 2012-13, which 
led to a massive and sustained reduction in homi-
cides. Former president Mauricio Funes (2009-14) 
initially denied any involvement, even dismissing 
the impact of the gang truce in the reduction of 
violence because it meant in essence a tacit ac-
knowledgment of giving in to gangs (Vuković & 
Rahman, 2018). In other words, the following mes-
sage was sent: The state is weak and can be black-
mailed. Four years later, current president Sanchez 
Ceren not only rejected the truce for considering 
it ethically suspicious and strategically wrong, but 
subjected gangs to increasingly militarized repres-
sion. In fact, a law prohibiting negotiation with 
them was passed, which even penalizes “calls for 
dialogue” (Tabory, 2016). 
In Mexico, an amnesty would send a negative 
message about the rule of law and leave serious 
crimes unpunished that no society can legalize. 
This measure poses the moral dilemma of not 
punishing behavior that, besides being illegal, 
beneficial and justified) and popular support (voluntary provi-
sion by the population of supplies, shelter, and intelligence). See 
Felbab-Brown, 2010, pp. 6-7.
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society considers reprehensible, such as murder, 
torture and kidnapping. Certainly, the discussion 
is played down when speaking of drug trafficking 
since, in principle, such illicit activity simply sup-
plies a demand for a product that is theoretically 
used as a personal choice—falling within the scope 
of individual freedoms. But if we refer to crimes 
that, by social consensus, are inadmissible, such as 
murder or torture, there is much to consider about 
an amnesty. Indeed, this has been a controversial 
issue in the peace process that seeks to incorporate 
farc into civil life11. 
In this regard, the proposal to grant an amnes-
ty has the disadvantage of conferring belligerent 
and politically unjustified legitimacy to criminal 
actors, such as the Knights Templar or the Sinaloa 
Cartel, to the extent that these would potentially 
be considered official spokesmen to the Mexican 
government. This means turning them into factual 
powers, authorizing civil servants in the security 
and justice sectors to collaborate with them out of 
fear or money (Salcedo Albaran, 2018). Basically, 
this condition would be their diplomatic recogni-
tion as enemies by the Mexican state (Lessing, 
2016), which in turn would allow the main car-
tels to further increase their influence and power, 
largely due to the country’s entrenched corrup-
tion and lack of accountability, as happened in 
Colombia during the ddr process with the para-
military in 2000 (Giraldo & Preciado, 2015).
11 Due to farc’s involvement in drug trafficking, the peace 
agreement established that the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (jep) 
should evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether the crime was 
committed to finance rebellion or for personal gain. Thus, drug 
trafficking will be considered a “political crime” if found to be 
used by guerrillas to finance their insurgent fight and may be am-
nestied. By contrast, former farc fighters shall be prosecuted and 
sentenced by ordinary courts for crimes related to drug traffick-
ing, if found to be for personal gain. And if a former farc member 
is convicted of drug trafficking after the signing of the agreement 
(November 2016), it will be considered a “regular crime” and will 
not be amnestied. This novel and controversial condition tries to 
address the concerns of former farc leaders over extradition to 
the United States for drug trafficking and disqualification from 
holding public office. The new Colombian president, Ivan Duque, 
has proposed a constitutional amendment to ban amnesties for 
drug trafficking, but he cannot do so retroactively. Any constitu-
tional change would apply to future peace processes, and not to 
former farc fighters. See Isacson, 2018.
Undoubtedly, social polarization around or-
ganized crime and instrumentalization of this 
issue for electoral purposes has profound conse-
quences on the possibility of an amnesty to reduce 
violence and crime rates nationwide. In contexts 
where criminal organizations control significant 
portions of the territory to the point of challeng-
ing their power, governments may be inclined to 
take such measures as an alternative to onerous 
repressive strategies, being able to attain electoral 
revenues from the improvement in public secu-
rity conditions as a result of the agreement made, 
as a peace dividend (Zukerman, 2016). However, 
for supporters of a more repressive approach, an 
amnesty will be politically difficult to assimilate, 
especially when the counterparty is a criminal 
group with no political-ideological ambition. 
Equally, governments fear a public opinion back-
lash, negative media coverage of the initiative, 
and paying a high price in political and electoral 
gains (Garrigues, 2015). 
Instead, setting a decline in levels of violence 
as the ultimate goal, following the granting of an 
amnesty in non-military contexts, is a substantial 
risk, as drug trafficking organizations may perceive 
that, if they become violent enough, they can sit 
down and negotiate with the government for more 
concessions. This violates the ethics of responsi-
bility in the Weber’s sense because the precarious 
peace that would be achieved by amlo today may 
cause an upsurge of violence tomorrow; to wit, 
short-term gains will be canceled by increased vio-
lence in the medium term. There are ways to alter 
the violence perpetrated by criminal groups, and 
that is precisely what the amnesty aims to achieve: 
“cartels have the ability not only to wage war but to 
stop it” (Hagedorn, 2005, p. 154).
In this sense, Farah (2012) argues that, in the 
case of El Salvador, negotiated peace represented 
a high political gamble. Imprisoned gang leaders 
were offered better imprisonment conditions in 
exchange for stopping executions and extortion. 
Funes risked worsening public security in the long 
term. The truce gave maras a share of political 
power, which improved safety indicators reported 
for that period. It also reduced gang homicides be-
cause territories were divided by mediation with 
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the consent of the state. Thus, gangs could force a 
collapse at any time simply by threatening to in-
crease the number of homicides. Even, gang lead-
ers were surprised and pleased with the results of 
negotiations, and began to understand that terri-
torial control and organizational cohesion make it 
possible to obtain concessions from the state, while 
maintaining their criminal nature (Ramsey, 2012). 
Cruz and Duran Martinez (2016) claim that 
situations like this can encourage criminal groups 
to strategically manipulate the visibility of vio-
lence12 and, thus, obtain greater concessions from 
authorities. Hiding violence seems to be a viable 
strategy because its level of visibility is easier to 
monitor by authorities as an indicator of compli-
ance with the agreement. In Mexico, cartels may 
be less likely to show violence when they receive 
privileges from the state or when they fear its reac-
tion to high-impact attacks. Thus, they may decide 
to inflict violence in a manner that is not sensed by 
the government, which means not an actual but an 
artificial reduction of criminal violence. So, amlo 
will depend on criminal actors to monitor the pa-
rameters of their covenant when trying to promote 
conditions for durability.
The feasibility of agreements will basically be 
contingent upon two fundamental conditions: (i) 
that the state plays a role as an administrator, and 
(ii) that participating criminal groups are cohe-
sive and have organizational leadership to facili-
tate territorial control and strategic reliability for 
compliance. Regarding the first requirement, a 
pact involving the state as a whole will probably 
fail due to police actions and lack of attention to 
structural factors that lead to violence and may 
motivate cartel members to reoffend. As to the 
second condition, the degree of internal cohe-
sion is not only vital to discipline individual and 
collective behavior of criminal groups during a 
peace process, but also to overcome the difficulty 
of identifying partners and authorized representa-
tives within criminal organizations, and thus hav-
ing the ability to take positions with respect to the 
12 Visibility of violence refers to how criminals take responsi-
bility for the attacks they carry out. See Snyder & Duran-Marti-
nez, 2009, p. 159. 
state (Cruz & Durán Martínez, 2016). This poses 
a singular paradox—all criminal peace processes 
require groups with strong leadership and highly 
cohesive structures.
Considering the above, it can be argued that 
amlo’s approach is directly linked to the discus-
sion initiated by Felbab-Brown (2013b) on how 
to create  good criminals: highly organized, not 
openly violent, with limited corruption capacity, 
and no range of service offer to society. In essence, 
an amnesty is not intended to de-escalate the il-
licit market, but to model its behavior—low profile, 
with no open confrontation position, and moder-
ate mortality rates. From this perspective, this ap-
proach shows that governments sometimes use 
law enforcement strategically to object, tolerate or 
simply manage violence associated with organized 
crime, rather than to combat it. So, since it seeks to 
reduce criminal violence only, an amnesty is likely 
to be a mere damage limitation strategy. 
Conclusions
We have seen that a radical change has taken place 
in the approach of the state to end war on drugs 
and employ peace keeping mechanisms, as if part 
of a peace process. We can see this approach in the 
election campaign in which the candidate amlo 
offered the granting of an amnesty, demobiliza-
tion and use of transitional justice. This shows how 
the state may move to pragmatic methods to outdo 
drug-related violence and leave behind the more 
traditional and tabooed outlook of dealing with it.
In this regard, we can identify amlo’s approach 
as a tendency to use law enforcement strategically 
in order to manage violence. This approach in-
volves agreements between cartels and the state 
authority, as well as supporting reduced prison 
terms, amnesty or ruling out extradition and 
other mechanisms as if in a post conflict context. 
As a pragmatic approach, it is radical in the way 
the state approaches eradication of drug traffick-
ing violence, considering that the traditional state 
method have solely been based on repression; how-
ever, this approach looks to reduce criminal vio-
lence only, where an amnesty is likely to be a mere 
damage limitation strategy. 
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From another perspective, granting an am-
nesty to criminal groups, as opposed to insurgent 
forces such as the currently demobilized farc, is 
morally and politically complex. It involves giv-
ing in to that fundamental principle that law is 
non-negotiable. Indeed, here the risks are higher 
than in a military context as drug trafficking orga-
nizations may perceive that, by becoming violent 
enough, they can sit down and negotiate such fun-
damental principles with the government in order 
to receive further concessions.
Further, amlo’s proposal to grant an amnesty 
has the drawback of conferring unjustified le-
gitimacy to criminal actors, such as the Knights 
Templar or the Sinaloa Cartel, to the extent that 
these would potentially be considered official 
spokesmen in dealing with the Mexican govern-
ment, turning them into factual powers. This con-
dition would be their diplomatic recognition as 
enemies by the Mexican state, which in turn would 
allow the main cartels to further increase their in-
fluence and power, largely due to the country’s en-
trenched corruption and the lack of accountability, 
as was the case of Colombia with the paramilitary 
during the ddr process. 
Finally, the chance that leaders and members of 
drug cartels would be willing to give up their con-
trol and methods of intimidation had not found 
much support in Mexico. The prevailing founded 
opinion is that human dignity is the least of their 
concerns.  Moreover, what these criminal organi-
zations use in order to establish their presence and 
domination and manage their illegal activities in 
their plazas is precisely in violation of human dig-
nity. Therefore, a pragmatic approach such as the 
consideration of an amnesty would not solve the 
problem of violence since the economic incentive 
would continue, and new criminals would only but 
substitute them.
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